OST INTEREST iates have risen to historically high levels in recent months. This development, in view of present law, has caused serious problems to develop in the credit markets because in most jurisdictions usury restrictions on the payment of interest have generally remained at previously established lower levels. The consequence of this has been that borrowers who are willing to pay the competitive rate for funds often find that they are legally unable to obtain financing. As a result, they are faced with the choice of either circumventing the law to obtain the desired funds or losing out to other borrowers who may not be svilhng to bid as much, but who are legally able to contract because of the nonuniformity of usury laws.
Despite the credit market distortions caused by ceilings on interest rates, usury laws have been retained in most jurisdictions. It is the intent of this article to provide some insight and perspective on the value of such restrictions by reviewing briefly the history and justification of such laws, the role of interest rates, and some of the effects of interest rate restrictions.' Usury laws have been traced back to the dawn of recorded history. Both legal and religious restrictions on interest charges were imposed in ancient times. 2
The early Babylonians permitted credit but limited the rate of interest. One of the earliest writings of the Bible stated, "Thou shalt not lend upon usury to thy brother, . . . Unto a stranger thou mayest lend upon usury; but unto thy brother thou shalt not lend upon usury ...."
In the New Testament (Luke 6:35) the admonition was broadened lend freely, hoping nothing thereby."
In Greece, Aristotle considered money to be sterile, and that the breeding of money from money was unnatural and justly hated. During the period of the Roman Republic, interest charges were forbidden, but they were permitted during the time of the Roman Empire.
During the early Middle Ages religious leaders treated the subject niore thoroughly, and reached the same conclusion -that interest on loans was unjust. The exploitation of the poverty-stricken by rich and powerful creditors who lent money at interest was considered sinful to the Christians of that period, who stressed humility and charity as among the greatest virtues and played down the value of earthly goods. Secular legislation responded to the Church's influence and, in general, interest charges and usury were regarded as synonymous.T he increase in economic activity and expansion of personal freedom that came with the Renaissance forced modifications in the prevailing views concerning interest rates. Recognizing that man was imperfect, Martin Luther and other 15th century reformers began to concede that creditors could not be prevented from charging interest. In the 16th century John Calvin rejected the scriptural basis for interest prohibition on grounds of conflicting interpretations and changed circumstances, but still advocated some control. Turgot, an 18th century French economist, claimed that money was the equivalent of land, and hence the owner should not be inclined to loan his money unless he could expect a return as great as he would obtain through the purchase of land. 4
Legal restrictions on the payment of interest were generally relaxed in the 18th century, but the belief continued that the people who needed to borrow funds should be protected against overly high charges. Consequently, most nations maintained legal maximum usury rates at "reasonable" levels, Usury laws in the United States were inherited, in large part, from the British in colonial days. While these laws generally remain in force in the United States, Great Britain, after intense pressure in the early 19th century, repealed these and other restrictions on commerce and trade in 1854.Õ ne factor complicating attempts to maintain interest rate ceilings arose from the fact that risks and administrative expenses in making very small loans were often so great that legitimate dealers could not handle such advances with prevailing rate ceilings. This situation fostered illegitimate loan "sharks" with exorbitant interest charges. As a result, it was eventually recognized that higher rates should be permitted on small loans, and the small loan laws emerged.
As noted, ethical and religious arguments have been relied on to a great extent to justify either the prohibition or limitation of interest payments. Another factor which has been instrnmental in sustaining support for usury laws has been public opinion which generally viewed the small borrower as an underdog at the mercy of large well-financed institutions, As a consequence of this public attitude, legislators have been reluctant to raise or eliminate interest rate ceilings.
Several economic arguments also have been advanced to justify usury laws, and these considerations tend to bolster the moral and political reluctance to raise rate ceilings. The first of these arguments asserts that whereas most lenders are knowledgeable about conditions in the particular credit market in which they operate, it is readily observable that a sizable number of borrowers are unsophisticated and naive. It is contended that these borrowers are concerned only with obtaining credit and do not even know what Ibid, A History of Interest Rates, p. 187,  rate of interest they are paying. Furthermore, relatively few make a serious effort to study conditions or to shop around for better terms or better timing. Finally it is argued that contracts made with such unknowing borrowers at rates above those existing in the market for similar types of loans represent a distortion of competitive forces and provide a windfall to lenders.
A similar argument for the regulation of interest rates is related to the comparative market power of borrowers and lenders. Since lenders are usually fewer in number and larger in resources than borrowers, it is contended that they haave market power which can be used to command artificially high rates. Hence, usury laws provide competitive balance between the two groups.
Another argument for interest rate regulation is concerned with the impact of lower interest rates on the economy. It has been contended that low interest rates are desirable to encourage more investment and consumption and promote faster economic growth.
Those who oppose interest rate restrictions view credit markets as relatively efficient when left alone to operate freely. According to this position free competitive markets lead to an optimum allocation of resources and maximum individual satisfaction. Consequently, interferences with noi-mal credit flows, by use of imposed ceilings on lending or deposit rates, can only create inefficiencies in financial markets which hamper production and exert an adverse influence on the distribution of goods and services, It has been charged that maximum loan rates are necessary because credit applicants are gullible and would enter into oppressive contracts without such protection. But, are not individuals just as likely to be gullible in their dealings in other markets? Why then is the credit market singled out as an area to promulgate legal restrictions against such oppressive contracts? More importantly, has this special attention had its intended effects? That is, can and do these laws protect the uninfonned from exploitation, and can the benefits of this protection be justified in view of the attendant social costs? Existing imperfections in credit markets could probably be reduced to a greater extent and with less cost by fostering greater competition among lenders. Also, education and counseling of borrowers may be a more efficient method to improve their performance than imposing rigid ceilings.
In most credit markets competiton is very keen. Major lenders include commercial banks, savings and loan associations, insurance companies, mutual savings banks, mortgage companies, sales finance companies, personal finance companies, credit unions, real estate investment trusts, fann credit agencies, retailers, and individuals. It is relatively easy to establish a business for lending funds, except for restrictions imposed by the Government. In most cases where competition is lacking in a given market, it has resulted from legal limitations on entry or activities. In practice, competitive forces have kept most market interest rates below usury ceilings for most of the past forty years.
For a brief period, artificially holding interest rates down probably does stimulate investment and contribute to economic expansion. 1-lowever, maintaining arbitrarily low rates by imposing ceilings discourages saving at the same time that it stimulates investment demand, placing upward pressure on interest rates. As a result, rates can only be maintained at the lower level by some form of nonprice rationing (which tends to reduce efficiency and offset, in the longer run, the sought-after investment increases) or by the creation of money and credit at progressively faster rates (which contributes to accelerating inflation).
Interest rates play a strategic role in the economy. Interest rates are prices, and, as is true of all prices, they serve a rationing function. They are the prices that allocate available funds, and hence command over resources, among competing uses. Normally, the term "interest rate" is used in reference to the return on marketable securities or a loan of funds. However, the concept of "interest rate" can he applied to all goods. The rate of interest reflects the price of the convenience of earlier availability, the preference for more certain rather than less certain consumption rights, and the economy's ability to use resources to increase output.
To the borrower, interest rates represent a cost, and as such, influence investment and consumption decisions. To the saver, they represent a return and affect decisions regarding the amount to be saved. To wealth holders and managers of funds. interest rates or yields are a common denominator for evaluating alternative fonns of holding wealth and alternative avenues for placing funds.
At any time, some individuals or businesses find that with their incomes, tastes, and investment prospects it is not desirable to pay the going rate for funds. They are "priced out of the market," just as there are those who find that at current prices it is not expedient to hire a servant, eat steak, or purchase a luxury automobile. Any movement in interest rates (as with other prices) will cause a reevaluation of projects which require the borrowing of funds.
Throughout most of the period since the l920s, usury laws have been ineffective because the interest ceilings were at levels above prevailing market rates. However, with the rise in inflation, and consequently interest rates, since the mid-l960s, usury laws have had a significant impact on many credit markets. Their effects have been quite arbitrary and have weighed heaviest on those credit seekers generally considered most risky.
Professor Roger Miller contends that usury legislation often adversely affects the ones it is designed to protect.
6 He illustrates this conclusion by citing the Washington state experience, where consumer loans from credit card companies were generally at an annual rate of 18 percent. Consumer advocates felt that this rate was much too lugh, and that poor people would be aided by a lower charge. In 1968, the maximum rate was lowered by referendum to 12 percent. However, at the lower rate the amount of credit demanded exceeded the amount supplied, and the people with the weakest credit worthiness were the ones denied credit at 12 percent. Welfare mothers, people with records of unstable employment, students, and the elderly fell into this category. Gainers from the reduced rates were the ones who had the most wealth, best jobs, and the highest probability of being able to repay the loan.
Sometimes those higher risk borrowers, who are refused credit from legitimate lenders because of usury laws, seek funds from loan sharks who ignore the legislated ceilings. Costs of operating outside the law are relatively high, and competition among such unscrupulous lenders is severely limited; hence, some interest rates may be several times the level that would have existed in the absence of ceilings. 7
As market rates approach usury ceilings, venture or developmental credit, which of course contains a higher than average degree of risk, becomes limited.°R Since such credit can only be extended by lenders at a higher rate of interest to compensate for the additional risk involved, these loans are among the first to be affected as market rates rise relative to usury ceilings. Without such venture capital, the entrepreneur is frustrated, and economic progress and growth is hampered. 5
By contrast, the volume of credit flowing to wealthy individuals and sound established businesses may be as great or greater under severe usury restrictions as under free market conditions.°Since low usury maximums prevent other individuals and firms from effectively competing for funds, a greater share of the available funds tends to flow to lower risk applicants. The anticompetitive effects of these laws are thus spread from credit to product markets.
In general, usury laws tend to be more restrictive in the central section of the country than in states on or near either coast. In several Eighth District states usury laws have been a major obstacle in credit markets. In Illinois and Missouri the current general usury ceiling is a very low 8 percent, and in Kentucky the ceiling is 8.5 percent. In each of these states, however, exemptions from the ceiling exist, such as for corporations. Despite the exemptions, many credit flows have been interrupted because of the ceilings, particularly away from potential individual borrowers, Arkansas, Mississippi, and Tennessee have somewhat higher usury ceilings -10 percent in each case. However, because of the lack of legal exemptions from the maximums in Arkansas and Tennessee, the ceilings have been causing substantial disruptions to borrowers, lenders, and the general economy of these states. This has been particularly noticeable since April when the prime rate on business loans nationally climbed above 10 percent. During May and June of this year, commercial and industrial loans declined 9.3 percent at weekly reporting banks in Memphis and Little Rock, while they were rising 2.8 percent at all weekly reporting banks in the nation. In the cor-5 Stndies show that in those slates permitting higher rates, lenders tenrl to expand credit opportunities. Lenders appear more willing to accept higher risk of losses if the rate is sufficient to compensate for l,ad debt, investigatiol4, and collection expenses. Main-ice B. Condzwaard, "Price Ceilings responding period last year, when market rates were below the ceilings, these loans changed little in Memphis and Little Rock and rose 2.9 percent nationally.
In an effort to alleviate hardship, the ceiling in Mississippi was raised to 10 percent from the extremely restrictive 8 percent level, effective July 1, 1974. In Illinois, the ceiling for residential loans was raised on July 12, 1974 from 8 percent to 9.5 percent for the period until July 1, 1975. Among Eighth District states, only Indiana has had credit markets relatively free from usury restrictions.
Quantitative measures of the volume of potential loans affected by tIme rate restrictions are not available, but comments from market participants indicate that it is sizable. The following sketchy, indirect evidence also indicates that the impact has been great.
In the first four months of this year, the average interest rate on FHA 3O-year mortgages was 8.78 percent nationally; in the corresponding period last year the rate was 7.62 percent. Two District states had usury laws applicable to home mortgages that were between these rates -Mississippi and Missouri at 8 percent. In these two states residential construction contracts fell 34 percent from the first four months last year to time comparable period tIns year, according to F. W. Dodge data. In Arkansas, Indiana, and iennessee, which had 10 percent or higher usury cciiings, and Kentucky and Illinois, which exempted certain residences fromn the ceilings, residential contracts declined 16 percent. The average decrease for the nation was 21 percent over the same period.
By contrast, contracts for nonresidential construction, which are frequently exempted from usury ceilings, rose 8 percent in Mississippi and Missouri from the first four months last year to the first four months this year. This was about the same as the 9 percent gain in Arkansas, Ilhnois, Indiana, Tennessee and Kentucky and greater than the 2 percent nationally in the same period.
Insured savings and loan associations in Missouri had a 74 percent smaller increase in savings "deposits" in April and May this year than they did in the corresponding months last year. Nevertheless,, these associations purchased 10 percent more mortgages in the two months this year when the national market rate on mortgages was above the state's usury ceiling than in the like period last year when the market rate was below the ceiling. This seemingly contradictory development can he explained by noting that the bulk of these purchases were from states where the
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State Basic Rote Some Moior Exceptions Alabama 8% For-individuals, firms, partnerships, associations, and nan-profit organizations the rate is 8% on loans to $100,000 and is% on loans above that, These same groups may agree to pay mare than 15% on loans greater than $100,000. Far corporations the maximum rate is 8% an loans to $10,000, 15% on loans between $10,000 to SI 00,000 and no ceiling on loans above $100,000, Alaska I 2%' Twelve-and-one-half percent is the rate on real estate contracts.
Arizona 1 o%
Eighteen percent is the ceiling for loans over $5000 to corporations.
Arkansas io%

California
10%
Savings and loon associations, industrial loan companies, banks, credit unions, and agricultural associations are exempt from the usury law. Colorado 12%
The maximum charge an non-supervised consumer loans is 12%. On supervised loans, except for revolving loans, the maximum rate is the greater of 18% on all unpaid balances; or a total of 36% on unpaid balances of $300 or less, 21% on unpaid balances over $300 and not over $1000; and 15% on unpaid balances ever $1000. The maximum rate on consumer related loans is 18%, on revolving loans 12%, and all other loans 45%.
Connecticut
12%
The ceiling rate on loans to corporations in excess of $10,000 is 18%. The 12% ceiling does not apply to any loon mode by any national or state bank or savings & loon, to any mortgage on real property in excess of $5,000, or made pursuant to a revolving loan agreement on which the total principal amount owing is more than $10,000.
Delaware
9%
There is no limit on collateral loans larger than $5000. Also the ceiting rate may be exceeded on loans secured by real estate only through written agreement.
District of Columbia 8% loans guaranteed under the National Housing Act or by the VA ore exempt.
Florida I o%
The ceiling is 15% for corporate loans and all other loans above $500,000.
Georgia
8%
No ceiling applies an loans above $2500 to corporations and on loans above $100,000 to individuals.
toans secured by realty may carry a rate of up to 9%. Hawaii 12%
Idaho I 0%
The maximum rate on non-supervised consumer loans is 18% and on revolving loans 15%. Supervised loans carry a maximum rote of 18% an all unpaid balances, or a total of 36% on unpaid balances of $390 or less, 21% on unpaid balances between 5390 and $i 300, and 15% on unpaid balances over $1300. A ceiling of 12% applies to loans of over $10,000 to corporations. Firms engaged in agriculture may be required to pay a maximum of only io% on loans.
Illinois
8%
Att corporate loans and business loans to non-profit organizatians; as well Os mortgage loans insured by the FHA or guaranteed by the VA may be contracted for at any rate. Also secured loans greater than $5000 may be at any rote. Effective July 12, 1974 the maximum interest rate that may be charged on loans secured by residential real estate and entered into before July 1, 1975 was raised to 9'/,%.
Indiana
18%
A maximum rate of 18% applies to non'supervised consumer loon,, consumer related loans and revolving loans. Supervised loans carry a maximum rate of the greater of 18% on all unpaid balances, or a total of 36% on unpaid balances of $300 or less, 21% on unpaid balances over $300 but under $1000, and 15% on unpaid balances over $1000. There is no maximum charge on other loans.
Iowa
9%
There is no ceiling rote on either corporate loans or real estate investment trusts. No maximum rote applies if the loan is for non-personal or business purposes and the contract is in writing and involves more than $2000.
Maryland a%
No ceiling applies to business loans in excess of $5000. Residential mortgage loans may be at 10%.
Mossachusetts None
Michigan
7%
No ceiling rate applies to corporote loans, realty secured loans, or federally or state approved loans.
Minnesota
8%
No ceiling rote is applied to loans in excess of $100,000.
Mississippi
10%
Corporations organized for profit may pay to 15% on loans in excess 0 t $2500.
Missouri
8%
Corporate loans may be of any rote.
Mon to no
Nebraska 9% Corporate loans may be at any rote. The maximum rate is waived on certain loans by building and loon associations, installment loans, industrial loans, and personal loans by bank and trust companies or credit unions. loans in excess of $50,000 moy be made ot any rote. The maximum rate on loans smailer than $50,000 is 12% for corporations and 10% for individuals and non-profit organizations.
STATE USURY LAWS' (Cont.)
Pennsylvania o%
The maximum rote does not apply to loans of more than $50,000, loans of $50,000 or less secured by o lien upon real property 1 loans to business corporations; unsecured, non'colloteralized loans in excess of $35,000; and business loans in excess of $10,000. The interest rate on residential mortgages of an original principol of $50,000 or less is o fluctuating administered rote. For July 1974 this rote was set at 9.5%.
Rhode Island 21%
South Carolina 8%
The maximum rate on loans of from $50,000 to $100,000 is io% and on loans between $100,000
and $500,000, 1 2%. Loans larger than $500,000 may be at any rote. Eight large banks in the District advance credit to a great extent in national money markets where lending rates are virtually unregulated. Also, during the second quarter of this year, total deposits of the eight large District banks, bolstered by large CD purchases, rose at a 36 percent annual rate, while deposits at other member banks in the District increased at a 11.4 percent rate.
The impact of usury laws on credit markets has been made somewhat more tolerable by legal exceptions and other methods devised to soften the impact of the legislation. \-Vithout such exceptions it is conceivable that credit flows could virtually come to a halt in states like Missouri when the national rate on business loans with prime credit risk exceeds the 8 percent ceiling which prevails in this state.
In a number of jurisdictions small loan laws have been enacted which permit higher rates on certain small extensions of credit tvhere operating costs are high and risk is frequently large. Many other legal exceptions have been granted for a variety of reasons. Retail credit charges, time-sales contracts, and loans to out-of-town residents are subject to higher ceilings in some states.
In Missouri, as in a number of other states, corporate businesses that are supposedly capable of protecting their interests in dealing with lenders are free to pay any rate that they desire, As might be expected, these corporations find that they have a tiemendous advantage in attracting funds over unincorporated firms and individuals that are "protected" by the state.
In addition, many credit market arrangements have been devised for circumventing usury laws and permitting credit flows which otherwise would be halted.
Some of these activities may be an outright violation of the law, such as simply ignonng the ceiling, or by calling the payment something other than interest. llowever, violation of usury laws frequently carries high financial penalties, such as loss of all interest or even principal; hence, lenders are generally reluctant to knowingly violate the statutes.
Other arrangements, which may or may not be technically legal, but which certainly conflict with the spirit of the law, have been adopted in order to effectively adjust a loan made at the legal rate to the market rate. One method is to lend to those who in some other way help you. Examples include the practice by lenders of favoring customers who maintain compensating deposit balances or whose firm does.
The effective rate on mortgages has traditionally been adjusted upward through the use of "points" charged either to the buyer, tile seller, or both, At times, loans have been granted by third parties at the legal rate, after which the real lender then purchases the loan at a discount. Other loans have been "closed" in a more liberal location, such as across a state line. Such techniques, although permitting credit to flow, run risks of illegality, are inefficient, and probably cause effective rates to be slightly higher to tile borrower and lower to the saver than they would be in a free market setting.
Lenders in states with low usury ceilings also have an option of moving funds into a state with more liberal laws, Comments from managers of funds indicate that the interstate movement of funds because of usury laws is sizable. Investment funds leave the state to finance mortgages in other states and to buy notes and bonds. Also, banks and savings and loan associations "sell" net sizable amounts of day-to-day Federal funds in the national money markets, This alternative of lending in another state protects large lenders to some extent and makes funds more readily available in states with liberal usury ceilings. However, such movements tend to be inefficient since credit is extended to less urgent projects and the cost of administering the loan is increased. Also, in the low ceiling state borrowers find credit still more difficult to obtain, lenders with small amounts are forced to accept lower yields, and economic activity suffers.
